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KEYNOTE LECTURE 1100 
"Creating Case Histories The Hard Way" 
Prof Ralph B. Peck 
University of Illinois & Consulting Engineer 
1101 Warm Sands, Dr. SE 
Albuquerque NM 87123 
On previous occasions like this, when I have been 
privileged to make opening remarks at these Rolla 
Case History Conferences, I have talked about the 
lessons that we can learn from studying other people's 
case histories. The attendance at this conference 
demonstrates that we all anticipate continuing this 
process, so it would be redundant for me to give a 
similar talk this year. Instead, I have chosen to tell 
you about four jobs, fairly early in my career, in some 
of which I made serious mistakes and from which I 
learned much myself. Thanks to forgiving clients the 
mistakes did not end my career, but they caused 
considerable embarrassment. 
You should realize that most of these jobs took place 
in what we would now call the early days of soil 
mechanics. Probably only a few hundred people had 
been exposed to the new subject at the hands of the 
early masters and were already practicing as individual 
consultants. We were captivated by the ability to 
determine the bearing capacity of a footing on clay 
from the results of unconfined compression tests 
instead of having to rely on traditional building codes, 
and by the ability to forecast the settlement of a 
foundation on clay by means of heretofore unheard of 
consolidation tests. We basked in this superior 
knowledge, and we sometimes used it indiscriminately 
or without considering its implications. We lacked the 
wisdom of our mentor, Karl Terzaghi, who was 
always keenly mindful of the shortcomings and 
limitations of his contributions to the profession. 
One of the first rude shocks came from an apparently 
straightforward slab foundation for a small building 
near the town of Ennis, Texas. For several years my 
colleagues and I had been advising the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. concerning the 
foundations for the towers and repeater stations that 
the corporation was constructing at about 30-mile 
intervals across the country to enhance its long 
distance service and later to permit transmitting 
television programs across the United States. We had 
developed an efficient and comfortable routine. A. T. 
& T. selected the locations along a route to satisfY 
their clear-sight requirements and took options on the 
properties. We reviewed the pertinent geological 
literature and visited each site in the company of 
several A. T. & T. engineers together with a 
representative of the boring contractor. We then 
specified the boring and sampling procedure, tested 
the samples, and finally recommended the foundation 
type and allowable loading for each structure. For the 
site at Ennis we made unconfined compression tests, 
as we had done for many sites on clay, and judged the 
clay to be so stiff that the bearing capacity was not of 
concern. Moreover, the clay was so stiff that 
consolidation settlement would be negligible. 
Consequently, we recommended establishing the small 
repeater station on a nominal concrete slab on a thin 
subgrade of compacted gravel. 
Most of you have already guessed at the outcome. 
After only a year the slab began to heave differentially 
and break up a behavior by no means unknown even 
then in this part of the arid Southwest. Some of the 
experiences had been described in the literature, but 
most of the expertise had been confined to local 
practitioners. We know about swelling clays but had 
not personally dealt with them before. In following 
the routine that had proven to be so efficient, we 
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overlooked the vitally important local experience. 
Fortunately, our client was philosophical about our 
shortcomings, perhaps concluding that we would learn 
from our experience. Obviously, many decades ago, 
the atmosphere was less litigious than today. The 
experience was sobering, even shocking. It deservedly 
made a great impression on me and my colleagues at 
the time .. 
The second rude shock also involved stiff clay. The 
Northern Pacific Railway long maintained extensive 
facilities to handle iron ore on the shore of Lake 
Superior in Wisconsin. A timber trestle had served for 
many years to cross a small valley but had become a 
source of expensive maintenance as well as a fire 
danger. To improve the conditions the railroad 
decided to replace the trestle by a fill. Borings 
indicated that the valley had been cut into a deep 
deposit of maroon-colored lacustrine clay associated 
with the glacial history of the area. The stability of the 
proposed fill was assessed on the basis of the 
undrained shear strength of the clay (although this 
terminology had not yet been adopted). The 
calculations showed that the factor of safety should be 
more than adequate to support the fill, which consisted 
of the same lacustrine clay. 
Nevertheless, when the fill had not quite reached the 
elevation of the track, it began slowly to subside, and 
the ground in front of the toe began to heave. For a 
time it seemed as if placing the fill in small increments 
between waiting periods might make completion 
possible, but this turned out to be a vain hope. The 
railroad was understandably unhappy and summoned 
us to the site. 
The borrow pits had been excavated, in the same 
lacustrine clays as the foundation for the fill, by means 
of large scrapers. Even a cursory glance at the 
excavated surfaces showed huge polished, 
slickensided, curved surfaces several meters in extent, 
quite randomly oriented throughout the deposit. 
Today, we would immediately conclude that the 
shearing strength along these surfaces would be at the 
residual value, but at the time of the project Skempton 
had not yet drawn attention to the concept of residual 
strength. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the 
polished surfaces were weaknesses in the mass of clay 
that had reduced its strength. Had their presence been 
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suspected, some reasonable allowance would probably 
been made, but the slickensiding had gone unnoticed. 
Probably this experience, more than any other, 
increased my awareness of the implications of the 
secondary structure of soils and the necessity to look 
for the evidence of such so-called minor geologic 
details. Again, it was field behavior, epitomized as a 
case history, that impressed this necessity on me. 
Somewhat more recently, but still some years ago, a 
system of evaporating ponds for recovering various 
dissolved chemicals was being constructed at the 
southern end of the Dead Sea. The ponds were 
enclosed by dikes of gravel, dumped from barges, in 
which central cores were to be constructed by the 
slurry-trench procedure. Difficulties arose because the 
unique chemistry of the Dead Sea water altered the 
behavior of the usual colloidal materials, such as 
bentonite, customarily utilized to stabilize the walls of 
the trenches in which the core materials are deposited. 
A controversy arose between the contractor and the 
design engineers: the designers maintained that the 
cutoff was unacceptable because the specifications 
were not followed, whereas the contractor maintained 
that the core material and the gravel zone it penetrated 
alongside the prescribed core were of low enough 
permeability to satisfy the intent of the design. The 
contractor appointed a board of consultants, of which 
the late Laurits Bjerrum and I were two members, to 
help verifY his contention. At the time, Dr. Bjerrum 
was head of the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, and 
the Institute had just developed a piezometer 
consisting of a porous tip at the end of a pipe that 
could be pushed into the ground and, after a brief 
period of equilibration, the pore pressure measured by 
means of a Bourdon gage at the top of the pipe. 
Provision also was made to inject water into the 
system at a measured rate and pressure in order to 
determine the permeability of the soil surrounding the 
tip. Laurits suggested that a series of such 
permeability tests in the core of the dikes could 
establish the permeability of the dikes as built and 
could settle the issue. 
Several hundred such tests were made, and it became 
apparent that the coefficient of permeability derived 
from all the cores was a remarkably uniform 10-< 
em/sec. Initially, such a low value seemed 
encouraging, but the consistency of the values seemed 
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to be abnormaL Consequently, NGI instituted an 
investigation that demonstrated that I 0-4 em/sec 
represented the maximum rate at which water could be 
forced through the apparatus and its porous stone 
even if the tip was submerged only in water at the 
applied pressures. At this particular time in the 
development of soil mechanics, hydraulic fracturing 
was just being recognized as a significant 
phenomenon, and Laurits suddenly realized that every 
test in the Dead Sea cores had simply fractured the 
cores, whereupon the inferred permeability was that of 
the equipment, not the dikes. 
Increased understanding of hydraulic fracturing was, 
of course, an unintended byproduct of the Dead Sea 
investigation. It was a matter of no little 
embarrassment to the members of the Board of 
Consultants that so many tests were made before the 
mechanism of the phenomenon was realized. But, in 
this instance at least, a developing case history led 
directly to an improvement in fundamental knowledge. 
Finally, one memorable case history drove home to me 
the point that some evident signs of distress may have 
nothing to do with either deficient structural or 
geotechnical inadequacies. The example was an 
upscale apartment house on Chicago's near North 
Side. It was constructed for a local judge as an 
investment for his retirement, but the earliest tenants 
complained about highly visible cracks in their 
plastered and painted walls. The judge understandably 
suspected that the foundation engineer had done an 
inadequate job, and I was asked to investigate. The 
cracks were indeed evident, but the differential 
settlements were very smalL When I inspected some 
of the apartments, I noticed that most of the walls had 
been painted - as was then the vogue - in very dark 
colors: deep green, dark brown for example. The 
slightest relative movement, exposing the brittle white 
plaster, led to a highly visible defect. The judge was 
a little dubious when I explained the situation and 
suggested that walls be covered with cloth and then 
painted, but the cosmetic treatment was successful and 
the engineer was off the hook. This case history may 
not hinge on soil mechanics, but it represents the kind 
of knowledge a foundation engineer needs and is 
unlikely to acquire except through personal experience 
or that of others as described in case histories. 
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When soil mechanics was young and I was only 
somewhat younger, experiences such as those I have 
described came, as they did to me, often the hard way. 
Now, fortunately, well documented accounts help us 
all - young and not so young alike - to avoid many 
pitfalls. Those recounted in the Proceedings of this 
Conference should help us to avoid even more. 
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